

1 FEB 1950

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GENERAL

1. Views on admission of Chinese Communists to UN--The US Delegation to the UN has expressed its belief that in view of the basic US policy to preserve the peace through collective action in the UN, it is to the interest of the US that the USSR resume participation in the UN as early as possible. The US Delegation also believes that: (a) the trend of developments may inevitably transform what is probably intended as a temporary Soviet withdrawal into a permanent one; and (b) the issue of Chinese Communist representation in the UN is not necessarily "a favorable one" on which to risk Soviet withdrawal. The Delegation concludes that in the absence of countervailing considerations, the US should cease discouraging other UN members either from recognizing the Chinese Communists or from voting against seating the Chinese Communist representatives in the UN.

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(CIA Comment: CIA believes that early seating of the Chinese Communist delegation by the UN would bring about the termination of the Soviet walkout.)

2. French reaction to Soviet recognition of Ho Chi Minh--US Ambassador Bruce in Paris expresses the view that Soviet recognition of Ho Chi Minh, with its implicit attack on "the integrity of the French Union," will: (a) induce a violent reaction in France; (b) sharpen French non-Communist opposition to the Communists; (c) strengthen the will of the people and Government to resist and contain Communist pressure; and (d) by quickening national pride in France, increase popular support for a more cohesive and determined policy toward the USSR. Pointing out that the US may soon be faced in Indochina with a situation

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similar to that formerly prevailing in Greece, Bruce recommends that the US: (a) stigmatize the Soviet action as a breach of the principles of international relations and a threat to world peace; (b) recognize Bao Dai immediately after French ratification of the Bao Dai accords; and (c) announce and extend at once any military or economic aid to Bao Dai which the US may contemplate.

(CIA Comment: CIA believes that the French Government's policy in Indochina will now gain considerable political and popular adherence in France among all non-Communist elements, including the Socialist Party.)

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